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   Abstract 
Oilfields can easily turn into battlefields. This happened more than once in the colony of the Dutch East Indies 
(Indonesia) in the 1940s, where Japanese, Dutch, Allied and Indonesian forces fought fierce battles over the 
control of the local oil facilities. With good reasons, because in those days the Netherlands East Indies was one 
of the world’s biggest oil exporters.  
   It all started in Telaga Said I, in northern Sumatra, in the Mid-1880s, where the first oil was discovered in the 
thick jungle. Shortly afterwards, in the Mid-1890s, in the swampy south of Sumatra oil of a better quality was 
found. As a result, nearby Palembang, an ancient city with harbour facilities, quickly mushroomed into a vibrant 
oil industry city, and the small kampoeng Pladjoei (Plaju), about eight kilometers further along the River Moesi 
(Musi), became a spider in an enormous petroleum infrastructure. The Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij 
tot Exploitatie van Petroleumbronnen in Nederlands-Indië (1890) formed in 1907 a subsidiary named the 
Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij (BPM/Shell) and built at Pladjoe the largest, most productive and modern 
refinery of Southeast Asia of its time. The scale of operations grew over time and the BPM planned a 
comprehensive company town with administration buildings, refineries and jetties for mooring tankers, pipelines, 
(rail) roads, and designed living quarters for its employees along a rectangular grid, including modern bungalows 
with shady gardens, shops, schools, sports fields and a church etc. Eventually, the BPM and the municipality of 
Palembang as the main oil actors created together a petroleumscapeii: a coherent network of spaces around the 
psychical and financial flows and interests of petroleum in the urban environment.  
   These times of prosperity and peace all suddenly came to an end when war and revolution broke out in the 
colony of the Dutch East Indies in the 1940s. As a result, the oil empire of the BPM was at risk. Based on both 
archival research and secondary sources, this paper elaborates on how the BPM spatially and economically 
planned its huge industrial oil-footprint at Pladjoe and safeguarded these oil facilities against all kinds of brutal 
intrusions and destructions during the Pacific War (1942-1945) and Indonesia’s struggle for independence 
(1945-1949). Remarkably, in reaching this goal and in their effort to restore the pre-war situation of peace and 
prosperity, the BPM’s captains of industry, Dutch Army commanders and politicians in the government seats of 
both Batavia and The Hague worked closely together. Constantly using oil as an economical weapon.  
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   Introduction 
At the beginning of the oil production in the Dutch East Indies stood the Dutch farmer’s son Aeilko Jans Zijlker, 
who went to the Indies to find his luck after an unhappy love. Zijlker, administrator of the East-Sumatra 
Tobacco Company, discovered oil in North Sumatra. It was a kind of oil seep, still of rather poor quality. After 
negotiations over royalties with the owner, the Sultan of Langkat, Zijlker in 1883 got the concession of the area 
and the permission to drill.iii After quickly assessing its potential, the Dutch King William III gave the company 
the name the Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van Petroleumbronnen in Nederlands-
Indië.iv This freestanding company was officially established on 16 June 1890 with a financial back up of about 
360.000 dollars.v Due to this amazing success, Zijlker was sent out to do some more pioneering exploration and 
drilling around his oil kampoeng, but his luck was not eternal as he suddenly died in December of the same year. 
Nevertheless, this site would eventually become the birthplace of one of the biggest multinationals of the world 
today: the Royal Dutch/Shell Group. 
 
Figure 1. General map, oriented to the northwest, of Palembang and environs, in 1938, with Kartapati (left / 
down), Pladjoe and Soengei Gerong (right/middle), and Bagoes Koening (middle). Source: Comprehensive atlas 
of the Nederlands East Indies. 
 
   Pladjoe: the pearl in the crown of the BPM  
When oil was found in the southern parts of Sumatra, it was the experienced Jan Willem IJzerman, head of the 
Moeara Enim Petroleum Maatschappij, who stepped in first and invested near the ancient city of Palembang, the 
capital of the province South Sumatra.vi Palembang, an important exporter of pepper and tin, was a major river 
transport hub, strategically located along the Malacca Straits and nearby Singapore and Batavia. All around the 
world at that time, oil production and transportation relied on water.vii From Palembang harbour to the open 
waters of the Bangka Straits was about 50 miles. The waterfront city stretched along both sides of the 750 
kilometers long muddy River Moesi (Figure 1). The main economic and political parts of town, like the Kraton, 
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the former sultanates’ fortified palace and its surroundings, were lying on the eastern bank, called the Ilir or Hilir 
(‘downstream’). At the western riverbank, called the Oeloe (‘upstream’) or Hoeloe (Ulu), about eight kilometers 
from the centre of Palembang, IJzerman established an oil refinery in 1897. At that time, this place was nothing 
more than a small kampoeng carrying the local name Pladjoe. There was no overland transport between the city 
centre and Pladjoe, as there were no bridges yet. People had to take the regular ferry. Hence, Pladjoe was lying 
across the river in relative isolation geographically and was transformed steadily into a well-organized western 
enclave; a symbol of modernity and European 
might.viii  
 
Figure 2. Bungalow in Pladjoe of a BPM-
employee, around 1947. Source: Mieke 
Huijsman-Engelberts. 
 
The facility had been built by the BPM in 1907 
on the west bank of the mouth of the tributary 
Komering and produced marketable secondary 
products which could be efficiently transported by oil tankers from the refinery’s jetty to Java, Singapore, United 
States or Japan. The refinery received crude oil from the rich oil fields of Talang Djimar, Praboe Moelih and 
Moeara Enim.ix Half of the Indies’ oil production was produced in this refinery, especially aviation crude, and it 
supplied mostly the Airforce in the Pacific.  
    
Figure 3.  Sports field Pladjoe compound is 
still in use, now as volleyball field, 2015. 
Source: Author. 
 
   Right next to the spread-out production 
refinery of in total about 1,500 x 2,000 meters, 
the BPM created on the west side an ancillary 
petroleumscape by building a compact 
compound with houses for its staff, employees 
and workers (Figure 2). Most of these stand-
alone villas were grouped in blocks of eight or 
ten and were almost identical in colonial design, depending on the rank of the employee.x The European 
employees’ houses were situated along palm-bordered avenues and impeccable manicured lawns, suited for 
private cars to arrive. Constantly, this area was extended to the south and southwest. The streets had no names, 
only numbers. The address was for example: ‘House 122’. The compound with its almost rectangular grid plan 
of about 500 x 1,000 meters was fully equiped with all kinds of facilities. The BPM had its own administration 
building, hospital, hotel, shop and pasar, backery, European primary school including library, church, clubhouse, 
‘soos’ with cinema and theatre, sporting fields for hockey and tennis, and of course, a swimming pool.xi To this 
very day, one can see the green and spacious compounds and enjoy the striking tropical modernity of the 
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architecture, despite the fact that some colonial buildings are dilapidated (Figure 3). Most of the original 
buildings are still in (the same) function. 
  
Figure 4. Pladjoe-complex, July 1945. The living 
quarters are on the west side. Map was based on BPM 
maps of 1936 and 1940. The reference shows only the 
technical installations. Source: Comprehensive atlas of 
the Nederlands East Indies.  
 
   Outside these white-collar communities of gloriously 
shaded streets and lots, the urban space of the colonial 
society was more differentiated, divided by multi-ethnic 
differences and from race-to-class-segregated. In the 
company town Pladjoe lived about 250 European and 
4,500 local Asian workers.xii Europeans were also 
accommodated in another BPM housing complex called 
Bagoes Koening (or Pladjoe-baroe: new Pladjoe), a little 
west from Pladjoe (Figure 4).  
   In order to facilitate the steadily growing petroleum 
industry and to improve the rather low standard of living, the municipality of Palembang started to construct new 
ancillary structures and assets, like asphalted public roads, railways, ports and airfields. Above all, the municipal 
Traffic Commission implemented a new town plan in 1935 designed by the Dutch architect Thomas Karsten. 
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Land was reclaimed from rivers and new public housing, inland transport systems, a ring road and several 
bridges over the Moesi were built, including the Wilhelmina Bridge (1939) over the Ogan River, replacing the 
river ferry. This arch bridge connected both oil refineries from the eastern to the western bank, where the new 
Kartapati railway station (1939), and the coal harbour, were located. On a regular basis ocean steamers navigated 
the river in the late 1920s. Meanwhile, the new and continuously extending oil (rubber and coal) industry led to 
the rapid influx of newcomers and a subsequent population increase.xiii Also in Palembang a ‘European’ quarter 
was built, called Talang Semut. 
   As such, the booming oil industry not only had an enormous influence on the socioeconomic structure of the 
city, but on the whole region as well. More than thirty-five oil-mining concessions in the area needed a complete 
network of iron pipelines in order to connect hundreds of drill towers, oil pumps and storage tanks, subsequently 
transforming the urban spatial landscape. In addition, the BPM built a road network, a vivid symbol of 
modernization, and forty-two schools throughout the southern province before the Pacific War.xiv Such an 
extended petroleumscape with various oil actors required multiple headquarters for administration and 
supervision, like in Batavia, designed in a modernistic colonial style in 1938 by the Dutch architect Thomas Nix. 
Above all, a network of BPM-fuel stations was extended all over Sumatra. According to a BPM-roadmap of 
1929 there were in total 185 fuel stations strategically positioned on the island; including 71 in the South 
Sumatra region; two in Palembang, one in Pladjoe and one in Djambi.  
 
   Monopoly of mighty BPM 
Further north, around the Residence of Djambi in Central Sumatra, the oilfields and small destillation companies 
of Tempino, Kenali Asam, Badjoebang, Betoeng and Mangoendjadja were situated. The fields were owned by 
the Nederlands Indische Aardolie Maatschappij (NIAM), a public-private partnership between the BPM and the 
Dutch East Indies government, set up in 1921. This joint venture was an economic novelty. It was the first time 
the government became an actor through shares in the Sumatran oil-industry.  
   The actual refining process did not take place in Djambi, but in Pladjoe instead.xv Starting in 1935, oil was 
transported from Tempino to Pladjoe through a pipeline over a distance of 270 kilometers through hilly country 
covered by dense forests, along ricefields, intersecting many watercourses. In 1938 Djambi had about 14 per 
cent of the total East Indies’ production in their hands.xvi In addition, and partly with NIAM’s support, some 
roads and an airport were built in 1933 and the city was linked to a railroad. In 1936 a road was opened between 
Palembang and Padang by way of Djambi.  
   Naturally, the BPM feared the increasing competition from the American Standard Vacuum Oil Co. 
(henceforth Stanvac), working through an affiliate: the Nederlandsche Koninklijke Petroleum Maatschappij 
(NKPM). Although the Dutch Indies government tried to keep foreign oil companies outside the colony through 
the Mining Act, the Stanvac struggled to compete with the BPM. So, they started in 1912 to operate their own 
refinery at Soengei Gerong, directly opposite Pladjoe, on the east side of the River Komering.xvii It developed 
into the second largest oil facility in the Asian region, receiving 3,500 barrels of crude per day by pipelines from 
the fields of Talang Akar.xviii The plant at Soengei Gerong really challenged BPM’s control of the global flows 
of oil as a strategically asset. In 1930, another serious rival emerged on stage: Caltex. They also worked through 
a subsidiary, called the Netherlandsch Pacific Petroleum Maatschappij Company (NPPM), and secured 
extensive exploration concessions in Central Sumatra and on the Riau-islands.xix  
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   In sum, the BPM had quite a strong position in the Dutch East Indies managing large export refineries and 
controlling an enormous distribution network spread over the Archipelago.xx Around 1930, the BPM owned 85 
per cent of the oil production, but in the end of the 1930s this percentage went down to 55 per cent due to the 
heavy oil competition with Stanvac, which owned already 30 per cent of the promising oil market. In 1938, oil 
and related products determined an output value of 23.6 per cent of the total export, a value of about 190 million 
dollars. The six million tons of oil produced yearly in the Netherlands Indies accounted for only 2.7 per cent of 
the world’s total.xxi Hence, the Dutch economy depended heavily on the revenues of the oil resources coming 
from its crown colony.  
 
Figure 5. Aerial view of Pladjoe, around 1930. Source: KITLV, Leiden.  
    
   Epic battle for oil 
For both Batavia and The Hague it was vital to keep a watchful eye on the emergence of Japan. In case of a war, 
The Netherlands, as one of the smaller European powers, was not able to defend its territory in Europe or its 
colossal colonial empire overseas. Silently, it trusted in the British military protection. After the German victory 
over the neutral Netherlands in May 1940, Japan stepped up pressure by sending two missions to Batavia 
demanding a bigger share of the East Indies’ oil export.xxii Without doubt, oil was the main quest of the armies of 
Japanese emperor and the reason for the invasion of the Dutch East Indies. Obviously, oil was vital for their war 
machine, but Japan had almost no experience and expertise in this branche. The weakness of her war potential 
lay chiefly in the fact that Japan’s home production of natural and synthetic oil amounted to only some 10 per 
cent of her annual requirements. Of her oil imports in 1939, about 53 per cent came from the United States, 38 
per cent from the East Indies and nine per cent from other countries.xxiii Somehow, Japan had to ensure means of 
replenishing her storage tanks.xxiv Tokyo needed yearly at least 7,9 million tons of oil to win their Greater East 
Asia War.xxv Sumatra could deliver 5,3 million, so for a long drawn-out conflict the Sumatran oil was crucial 
(Figure 5). Therefore Japanese troops were instructed to put the most important oil centers in their hands quickly, 
without any loss or destruction (Figure 6). At the same time, Dutch troops were instructed to destroy the oil 
facilities before Japanese troops could get in. Authorities in Batavia had boasted that they had 500,000 tons of oil 
in storage in Palembang and that if the Japanese forces should start a river-ascending operation, they would 
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release 10,000 ton of oil per day into the Moesi and burn up the convoy coming up the river.xxvi The Dutch 
colony was in peril.xxvii 
   Meanwhile, after the fall of France, Japan occupied Air and Naval bases in French Indochina. Immediately, the 
American President Roosevelt announced in August 1941 the embargo on the export of oil, including a freeze of 
all bank transfers. Great Britain and the Dutch government in exile in London followed with the same measures 
instantly.xxviii On 8 December, a day after the attack on the American Navy fleet in Pearl Harbor, Batavia 
declared war on Japan. One month later, on 11 January 1942, the Japanese Navy conquered the oil-island 
Tarakan and the oil centre Balikpapan on Borneo. One month later, on 14 February, at the time that the 
invincible British fortress in Singapore was about to fall, a Japanese invasion fleet of about 10,000 men was 
sailing toward South Sumatra. Their operational plan was to attack the oil refineries at Pladjoe and Soengei 
Gerong and seize the superior airodrome Talang Betoetoe near Palembang, where temporarily American B-17 
Flying Fortress bombers were stationed.xxix In order to secure these sites and halt the frustrating scorched-earth 
policy, Japan flew in almost 600 men of the 1st Paratroop Raiding Group by complete surprise.xxx 
 
Figure 6. Japan’s need for Palembang’s oil. Source: Johan 
Fabricius, Brandende Aarde. 
 
   To defend Palembang, there were about 2,000 Dutch 
troops, plus reinforcements of Australian units and British 
anti-aircraft sections. The Territorial Command of the Royal 
Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) under Lieutenant Colonel 
L.N.W. Vogelesang, wanted to wait as long as possible 
before destructing the refineries. Influenced by the oil 
companies only a limited destruction was planned, keeping 
the main installation in tact.xxxi Suddenly, in the middle of 
the night of 15 February, he received the order from Batavia 
that his military units had to demolish the refinery, at last. In 
the rush, the huge tanks with oil products were not damaged 
at all, neither the refinery. After this half-hearted action, 
they hastily retreated and quietly slipped away in the 
darkness.xxxii Pladjoe was soon completely in Japanese 
hands and they managed to put out the fire in the boilers, shut valves, turned cranks and disarm most of the 
demolition charges placed in the complex by the Dutch before they were driven out.xxxiii From now on Pladjoe 
was called ‘refinery no. 1’ and managed by Nihon Sekiyu (‘Nippon Oil’).   
   The refinery of Soengei Gerong, on the contrary, was succesfully defended by Dutch troops. After the order of 
Vogelesang, military units deliberately destroyed 80 per cent of the refinery, including the oil tanks, using a 
time-delayed demolition charge.xxxiv Nevertheless, the damage done to the refineries and machineries were easily 
fixed by a group of Japanese drilling crewmen and oil-engineers, resuming the production after six months.xxxv  
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   Japanese occupation  
At the start of the Japanese occupation the oilfields in Palembang fell directly under control of the Japanese 
military. They made use of about 150 oil-employees who were forced to work for them for almost one year, but 
later were sent to prisoner’s camps. The Japanese could therefore only rely on the local oil personnel and they 
were hardly capable of maintaining the modern machineries.xxxvi During the war this led to a considerable lack of 
investments and oil was unprofessionally distracted from the oilfields. As a result, the production went down 
drastically, as the annual reports of the ‘Koninklijke’ pointed out.  
   At the end of the Pacific War, massive Allied bombardments started on Palembang. First, the attack by 
American B-29s in August 1944 was launched, but with negligible effect. Plans were adapted and in January 
1945 a more precise series of British air strikes was undertaken on the Japanese held twin refineries that were 
supplying at that time half their oil and three quarters of their aviation spirit. Next to these ‘Palembang Raids’ 
that diminished the oil production, Japanese oil tankers were attacked which had a tremendous effect on the 
capacity of transportation of oil to Japan. These collective Allied efforts made Japan’s war machine eventually 
come to a halt.xxxvii 
 
   Re-capturing the oil facilities 
During the Japanese occupation, the Indonesian nationalist movement had gained in power. Nationalist leaders, 
pressed by fanatic Indonesian youth (pemuda), seized the opportunity created by the unexpected Japanese 
capitulation. Watched by the still unbeaten Japanese troops in Indonesia of over 250,000 men, Achmad Soekarno 
proclaimed the independent Republic of Indonesia unilaterally, on 17 August 1945, two days after the Japanese 
surrender. This revolutionary action prevented that the oil installations automatically fell back in Dutch hands. 
Especially the British surpreme command, led by Sir Philip Christison, realized that the Indonesian people were 
fighting for their cause and issued a statement that implied a de facto recognition of the Republic.  
   Meanwhile, the situation on the oilfields was complicated. Upon request of the Allied forces the refineries at 
Pladjoe and Soengei Gerong were temporarily put under supervision of Japanese soldiers in September 1945. 
The Imperial Japanse Army had to occupy these oil installations, including the nearby oilfields and stop the oil 
production immediately. All the other oilfields in South Sumatra were taken over by the Indonesian forces. On 
sight, Indonesian (oil) freedom fighters (lasjkar minyak) quickly founded their own semi-militarized oil labour 
unit: Persatoean Pagawai Minyak (PPM). This inititative came from Dr. Adnan Gani and Dr. Mohammad Isa, 
who both had a prominent seat in the regional government of the Republic in Palembang.xxxviii  
   The CEO of the ‘Koninklijke’, Dr. Barthold van Hasselt, was watching the nationalist developments with 
displeased eyes. He was eager to start the reconstruction of the refineries and make money, like in the old 
days.xxxix Therefore, he tried to convince the British and Dutch military command of the enormous interests that 
were involved in the oil business.xl In his opinion the Japanese troops should be replaced by British troops. 
These were not available, because the spearhead of the military operation was on Java. The British were not 
inclined to help out the BPM.xli  
   Then something remarkable happened. Dr. Gani, Governor of South Sumatra, proposed that the BPM itself 
should take over the Japanese control at the oil centers as quickly as possible.xlii He really wanted two things in 
return. First, the BPM had to pay interests over the profits to the Republic.xliii Secondly, all the Indonesian 
workers that were occupying the refineries at that moment should be hired by the BPM and paid in kind with 
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food, textiles and household items.xliv A profitable oil deal, because through this peaceful consultation and smart 
oil diplomacy, at the end of September 1946, the Republic gained the international recognition they urgently 
needed, and the BPM succeeded in taking control again of their most valuable oil installations without any 
intervention of neither the Dutch government nor the Army.xlv As a bonus, the ‘trade-soldier’ Gani hoped to 
consolidate his political base and improve his own economic position.xlvi  
   Nevertheless, truce and peace were apparent. The situation escalated in the end of October after an 
inflammatory speech by the Republican General Soedirman. The Republican revolt was reverted and led on New 
Year’s Day 1947 to heavy bombing of Palembang by combined Dutch units of Navy and Airforce. This punitive 
strike was undertaken without any notice or warning, causing many civilian losses and it left the city in ruins.xlvii 
After this ‘Battle of Five Days and Five Nights’ Republican troops were forced to withdraw in a radius of twenty 
kilometers around the petroleum city. Subsequently, their political leaders fled and joined the radical camp in the 
Djambi area.  
 
   Operation Product 
Since the landings of Dutch troops in March 1946, the progressive Dutch Lieutenant Governor-General Hubertus 
van Mook in Batavia and several politicians from the then cabinet Beel in The Hague became more susceptible 
to the oil interest in South Sumatra, and they were increasingly inclined to intervene. The First Dutch Offensive 
(‘Eerste Politionele Actie’) soon followed in July 1947 and throned the appropriate name Operation Product. 
The main goal was to occupy the vital economic areas as soon as possible and restart the main companies. 
Moreover, there was plenty of work for the tens of thousands of people in the overcrowded areas. So they hoped 
in this way that an important recruitment basis for the Indonesian freedom fighters would disappear.   
   The Dutch Y-Brigade led by the hotheaded Colonel Frits Mollinger had to occupy the key oil centers around 
Palembang. From a military and economic point of view the invasion was a success. Mid-August a substantial 
recovery of the oil production was realized and the refineries received oil again from the oilfields and worked its 
way up to 2,5 million barrels per day.xlviii The Second Dutch Offensive in December 1948 had hardly any effect 
on the oilproduction at Pladjoe. This crown jewel of the BPM turned at full speed. Ironically, the Dutch military 
successes were a pyrrhic victory, because they caused US support to shift to the Republic and forced the Dutch 
to negotiate the transfer of sovereignity to Indonesia. Interestingly, during both military operations small units of 
BPM-technicians closely followed the Dutch forces in order to reboot oil extraction in the recaptured areas.xlix  
 
   Oil-diplomacy  
The management of the BPM, amongst them Johan Frederik van Diermen, the headstrong administrator of 
Pladjoe, was exploring the possibilities to regain control of the oilfields near Djambi. In a secret report addressed 
to Prime Minister Louis Beel, the BPM did not show support of a military action against Djambi for fear of 
damage and sabotage to the oil installations. Instead, the BPM paid 5,000 dollars to Republican security forces 
of the oilfields and installations near Djambi, in order to prevent destruction.l The BPM pragmatically went even 
one step further and started in May 1948 direct negotiations with the moderate leaders, and ‘oil barons’, Isa, 
Gani and Pattiasina, who had fled to Djambi after the earlier battle around Palembang. As a result of these 
‘peace talks’, the vital oil concessions fell back into the mother’s womb. The BPM staff was very relieved, but 
Van Diermen’s conduct led to great outrage with the headquarters of the ‘Koninklijke’ in The Hague and with 
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the staff of Stanvac, as they were not informed at all.li This wasn’t for the first time; it happened before with the 
Gani-deal at Pladjoe. The Minister on Overseas Territories, Lubbertus Götzen, informed the Prime Minister 
rightaway and told him that 'Van Diermen could not care less who has the authority, if only he gets oil’.lii  
   Directly after the landing of Dutch paratroopers on 29 December 1948 and again on 5 January 1949, rebels 
caused severe damage to the NIAM-oilfields near Rengat and Air Molek. The BPM staff had forecasted this 
sabotage in many conversations with Dutch politicians.liii However, both the BPM and Dutch politicians were in 
favor of recapturing this important oil center.liv Not at least, because the American oil company Cowie & Co 
INC was eager to buy local concessions from the Republic for one million dollars.lv During the military action 
small technical units of the BPM operated again as ‘advanced parties’ in the slipstream of the Dutch troops and 
were able to minimize the damage and start repairing works.lvi Mid-1949 crude oil was being piped again at pre-
war production level.   
 
   Conclusion 
This history shows how the south Sumatran city of Palembang industrialized and urbanized enormously due to 
the booming oil industry of the BPM, and how the lay-out of the company town Pladjoe grew bigger and bigger 
by ambitious planning of the BPM. Also this paper shows what was at stake for the BPM in the political turmoil 
of the 1940s, what was lost, regained and kept for the future. As for Japan, Palembang and the refineries in 
Pladjoe, was a coveted military prize. Remarkably, in their effort to safeguard the oil business and restore the 
pre-war situation of peace and prosperity, BPM’s captains of industry, Dutch Army commanders and politicians 
in both Batavia and The Hague worked closely together. Constantly using oil as an economical weapon.  
   With the advent of the Indonesian independence in December 1949 the balance was drawn up. It was clear that 
the BPM failed to arrange business according to the pre-war situation. Pladjoe and its infrastructure was indeed 
saved from total destruction, but Djambi was regained only in 1949 and the refinery in Pangkalan Brandan, the 
origin of the Royal Dutch Shell, was lost forever due to fierce local resistance in Atjeh. Despite this outcome, the 
post-war oil production would eventually triple, compared to the pre-war average situation.lvii  
   Besides, in the beginning of the 1950s the urgency for road renovation and construction in Palembang was 
more apparent than ever, especially in the Ulu area, which was heavily damaged during the war and revolution. 
Therefore the municipality implemented in 1950 a reconstruction plan, designed by Dutch architect H. Lüning.  
   Furthermore, in the Mid-1950s when postcolonial Indonesia was under the spell of anti-Dutch sentiments, 
Jakarta did not nationalize the BPM, but declared the company indispensable for their national economy, 
instead.lviii Finally, in December 1965, when the local political situation was rather unstable, the ‘Koninklijke’/ 
Shell pulled out by selling all the rights in exploration and production for 110 million dollars to the Indonesian 
state owned oil company Pertamina.lix Again a smart oil-deal, but Shell would return soon.	 
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